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Abstract 
We analyze the impact of the national minimum wage (NMW) in the UK on the employment 
of young workers. We utilize the regression discontinuity approach to assess the impact of 
age-related increases in the NMW when workers turn 18 and 22. The previous literature has 
found little evidence of an adverse impact of the NMW on the UK labour market, both when 
considering the age-related increases or the regular annual increases that apply to all NMW 
rates. We fail to find any effect of turning 22 on employment. However, we find a significant 
and negative effect of male workers turning 21. We also find a negative effect for both 
genders upon turning 18. The age-related NMW rates may have an adverse effect on 
employment of young workers, with this effect possibly occurring already well in advance of 
reaching the threshold age. 
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1 Introduction 
The imposition of a mandatory minimum wage, whether at national, regional or industry level, is a common 
instrument of economic policy: most OECD countries impose some form of a minimum wage (Dolton and 
Rosazza-Bondibene, 2011). Even Hong Kong, which traditionally espoused a laissez-faire approach to 
regulation, recently introduced a minimum wage. Nevertheless, the minimum wage is a contentious measure, 
one that is often blamed for raising workers’ earnings at the expense of lowering employment. Indeed, standard 
neoclassical economic theory predicts that, under the assumption of competitive markets, a wage floor should 
either have no effect on employment (if set at a sufficiently low rate) or it should lower employment (by 
preventing the least productive workers from finding work at market-clearing wages).1  
To date, the empirical evidence on the employment effect of the minimum wage is equally contentious. In a 
review, Neumark and Wascher (2007) argue that the bulk of studies point to a negative employment effect of 
introducing (or increasing) the minimum wage both in the US and in other countries. Workers who are most 
likely to be affected by the minimum wage, such as young workers and the low-skilled, are said to experience 
especially large disemployment effects (nevertheless, they find that the negative effect is mitigated somewhat 
when young workers are subject to a lower minimum wage rate). The range of estimated elasticities, however, is 
very broad: from significantly negative to significantly positive. This resonates with the findings of an earlier 
overview study by Dolado et al. (1996) who consider the employment effect of minimum wage rules in France, 
the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. Their results are inconclusive, with the estimated effects ranging from 
negative (especially for young workers again) to positive. The meta studies by Card and Krueger (1995b) and 
Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009), likewise, conclude that there is little evidence that the minimum wage causes 
lower employment. Hence, if anything characterizes the state of the current discourse on the employment effect 
of the minimum wage, it is lack of consensus.  
Despite the lack of conclusive evidence of adverse employment effect of minimum wages, policy makers 
seem concerned about it, especially during the current economic and financial crisis. Ireland took a largely 
unprecedented step in February 2011 when it reduced the minimum wage by €1 (from €8.65 to €7.65, 
corresponding to a 12% cut); this move, however, was subsequently reversed in April 2011. When the reduction 
was announced, it was justified by the need to increase the labour market flexibility and ensure that Irish firms 
remain competitive during the crisis period. The bail-out package offered to Greece by the troika of the 
European Commission, ECB and IMF, similarly, stipulated a reduction in the minimum wage. In February 2012, 
Greece undertook to lower its minimum wage by 22% (the rate for under-25s was lowered even more 
                                                          
1 Once we relax the assumption of competitive markets, however, the theoretical predictions can change 
dramatically. Assuming monopsony in the labor market, in particular, can result in a positive employment effect 
of the minimum wage (Dolado et al., 1996): monopsony employer can push wages below the marginal product 
of labor, thereby maximizing profits while depressing employment. Imposing a wage floor, correspondingly, 
reduces the employer’s profits and increases employment. 
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dramatically, by 35%). Hence, it appears that, at least during the times of extraordinary economic hardship, 
policy makers assume that the relationship between employment and minimum wage is negative.2  
The UK introduced the current national minimum wage (NMW) framework relatively late, in April 1999.3 
Thereafter, the NMW has been subject to regular annual revisions, coming into effect every October from 2000 
onwards. Since shortly after its introduction, the effect of the NMW on employment has been analyzed by a 
number of studies. Stewart (2004) and Dickens and Draca (2005) considered the effect of the NMW’s 
introduction and the impact of the annual minimum-wage increases in the subsequent years. Dolton, Rosazza-
Bondibene and Wadsworth (2009) utilized the fact that, unlike the NMW rages, average earnings vary 
considerably across the regions of the UK. They used the resulting variation in the ‘bite’ of the NMW at the 
regional level to assess its impact on employment. Invariably, these studies (as well as others not cited here) find 
little evidence that the UK NMW has had an adverse effect on employment.  
In this paper, we seek to contribute further to this discussion. We focus on a particular institutional feature 
of the UK minimum wage regulation: the existence of separate (lower) rates for young workers. At its 
introduction in 1999, besides the regular (adult) rate, the NMW specified a separate rate for those between 18 
and 21 years of age (the so-called development rate).4 In 2004, a separate rate was introduced for those aged 16 
and 17 (who were exempt from the NMW until then). This allows employers to hire young workers at a discount 
relative to the adult rate. Specifically, the ratio between the adult rate and the development rate has remained 
approximately 1.2 since 1999. The ratio between the development rate and the 16-17 rate has been 
approximately 1.35. In turn, this means that young workers who earn only the NMW rate relevant for their age 
experience a sharp wage increase upon turning 18 and then again at 22.5 While productivity is likely to increase 
with age, workers who are 22 are at best only marginally more productive than those who are 21 years old. 
Therefore, if the NMW affects employment, this should be especially apparent in the case of young workers.  
The impact of age-related increases in the NMW on the employment of young workers in the UK has been 
investigated in earlier research by Dickens, Riley and Wilkinson (2010, henceforth DRW). They apply a 
regression-discontinuity approach to investigate how the employment status of low-skilled young workers 
                                                          
2 The lowering of the minimum wage is part of a broader effort aimed at facilitating real exchange rate 
depreciation at a time when the nominal exchange rate is irrevocably fixed. At a time when other prices are 
falling, keeping the nominal minimum wage frozen would be equivalent to increasing it in real terms.  
3 Up until 1993, the Wages Councils had the power to set minimum wages for specific industries (not all 
industries had a Wages Council). No minimum wage was in place in the period between 1993 and 1999.  
4 From October 2010, the upper limit for the development rate has been lowered to 20. The data used in our 
analysis, however, pertain to the period before this change.  
5 In most of our analysis, we focus on those subject to the 18-21 rate. The workers aged 16-17 differ from their 
older counterparts in several important ways: they are more likely to be in full-time education, their 
employability is lowered by restrictions such as not being allowed to sell alcoholic beverages and their eligibility 
to benefits is more limited. Therefore, it is difficult to discern whether any employment effects that may occur 
upon turning 18 are due to becoming eligible to the higher NMW rate or whether they are entirely attributable to 
the age effect.  
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changes when they turn 22. They find, somewhat surprisingly, that low-skilled young workers who turn 22 are 
significantly more likely to be employed and significantly less likely to be either unemployed or out of the 
labour force. Such a positive effect of becoming eligible for the higher NMW rate is counter intuitive. 
Nevertheless, they attribute this to an increase in labour supply by young workers: if the lower development rate 
is below the reservation wage of some workers, such workers postpone their labor market entry until after they 
can be certain of earning a sufficiently high wage. The positive employment effect for low-skilled workers, 
moreover, appears rather robust: they find no significant effect when workers reach 21 or 23 years of age 
(falsification tests) and neither do they find any effect at the age of 22 before the minimum wage was introduced 
in the UK. However, the result disappears when they consider all workers rather than only the low-skilled ones.6 
This is especially peculiar as they find the NMW to have a positive effect for the types of workers who are most 
likely to be paid the minimum wage and should therefore be more adversely affected than workers overall.  
In this paper, we revisit and explore further the result of DRW (2010) with a somewhat longer data series. 
Our analysis differs from theirs in a number of potentially important aspects. First, we consider all workers 
rather than only low-skilled ones. Young workers are generally more likely to be subject to the minimum wage, 
more or less independently of their skill level. DRW indeed report that the shares of low and high skilled 
workers paid the minimum wage are only marginally different from one another: 10% of high skilled vs 11% of 
low skilled workers aged 21 earn less than the adult rate.7 Second, while we follow DRW in implementing the 
discontinuity approach, we interpret the discontinuity effect differently. Specifically, since the effect of age on 
employment can be different before and after the discontinuity, we account for this when evaluating the effect of 
reaching the relevant age threshold. Finally, our analysis is based on extended data set relative to the one used by 
DRW.  
While we replicate some of DRW’s results, we also find important differences. In line with their result for 
all workers, we find that the effect of turning 22 on employment is not significant. Somewhat surprisingly, 
however, we find that male workers are less likely to remain employed after they turn 21. While reaching the age 
of 21 has no effect on the minimum wage, this finding may be consistent with employers anticipating the wage 
hike that would occur at 22 and shedding workers approaching that threshold well in advance of them reaching 
it. When considering the effect of turning 18, we find also a negative effect of turning 18; moreover, the negative 
effect is found both for males and females.  
Our finding for males turning 21 reflects the specific nature of the framework that we are considering. The 
regression discontinuity approach is a quasi-experimental method of evaluating the effect of treatment that is 
assigned randomly (at least in approximation, see Lee and Lemiux, 2010, p. 283). In this case, the treatment and 
its timing is entirely deterministic: all young workers age (except Peter Pan) and they turn 22 in an amount of 
time that is perfectly known in advance to them and to their employers (as well as to their employers accountants 
                                                          
6 Low skilled workers are defined as those whose qualifications are no higher than the GCSE exams (equivalent 
to incomplete high school).  
7 Table 3 (p. 26), Dickens, Riley and Wilkinson (2010).  
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and lawyers). It is therefore not surprising to see the effect of age take place even before the workers reach the 
age threshold.8  
The next Section presents the data used in our analysis. The results of the discontinuity analysis are in 
Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper by summarizing the results and suggesting some tentative avenues for 
further work.  
 
2 Data 
Our analysis is based on the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a quarterly nationally-representative 
survey of households across the UK. Each quarterly file contains information on approximately 60 thousand 
households and over 100 thousand individuals aged 16 and above. Each household is retained in the survey for 
five consecutive quarters, with one-fifth of households replaced in each wave. The survey contains detailed 
demographic and socio-economic information on the respondents, including, importantly, their labour market 
outcomes. Since the NMW was introduced in April 1999, we use all quarterly datasets available since then. Our 
data thus span the period from April-June 1999 to October-December 2009, pooling all available LFS waves 
during this period.  
The LFS contains information on the precise date of birth of every respondent.9 We use this information to 
compute the age of each individual in months. Crucially, we also have the date the survey was carried out. By 
comparing these two dates, we can determine the precise age of each respondents in months, on the day when the 
survey was carried out. We thus know exactly whether a particular individual is 21 or 22 at the time of the 
survey, even when their birthday falls within the month in which they were interviewed. As is common in the 
regression-discontinuity literature, we redefine age so that it takes the value of 0 in the month when the 
individual reaches the threshold age of 22 (or 18) years. 
Our treatment of age differs slightly from that implemented by DRW who only consider the year and month 
in which the respondent was born and compare this with the year/month when the survey was carried out. As a 
result, for each discrete age in months, some respondents are in fact falling short of that age according to their 
approach while all respondents are correctly aged in our analysis.10 DRW therefore use the information on age in 
                                                          
8 In essence, this is similar to models of speculative crises (Salant and Henderson, 1978, and Krugman, 1979) 
which predict exchange rate crises rationally occur in anticipation of foreign exchange reserves being depleted 
and not when the reserves actually reach zero.  
9 This information is not available in the publicly released LFS datasets. We are grateful to the Low Pay 
Commission and the Office for National Statistics for making the restricted release of the LFS available to us.  
10 For example, consider the case when a group of respondents, all born in April (of any year) are interviewed on 
15
th
 April. When considering only the month and year of birth, it would appear that all of them have already 
passed their birthday. One needs to therefore use also the date of birth to determine the true age of each 
individual.  
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years, also contained in the LFS, to correctly classify those respondents who appear to have reached the 
threshold ages of 18 and 22 years, without similarly correcting the age in months of the remaining individuals.11 
 
3 Employment Effect of NMW on Young Workers  
To assess the impact of age-related MNW increases, we start by looking at individuals on either side of 22 years 
of age (corresponding to 264 months). For our baseline model, we consider individuals who are within 15 
months of their 22nd birthday. Since, as explained above, we redefined age so that it takes the value of 0 when the 
respondent reaches the relevant threshold, our analysis considers young workers whose ages in months fall 
between -15 and 15 months. While each LFS quarterly data set contains information on around 100 thousand 
individuals, only a relatively small fraction of those are workers in the relevant ages. By considering a wider 
window (+/-15 months), we are effectively maximizing the number of observations that we can utilize in our 
analysis. As a robustness check, we replicate the analysis also for 12 and 6 month intervals.  
The regression discontinuity approach allows us to estimate how labor-market outcomes are affected by 
whether a worker is older than the age from which the adult rate of NMW applies. Here, we use the econometric 
methodology proposed by Lee and Card (2008) to account for the uncertainty in the choice of functional forms 
in regression discontinuity designs in the case of discrete covariates. In this setting, it is no longer possible to 
estimate the impact of a covariate on the dependent variable by simply computing averages within arbitrarily 
small neighborhoods of the cutoff point, even with an infinite amount of data. Instead, it is necessary to choose a 
particular functional form for the model relating the outcomes of interest to the treatment-determining variable. 
Of course, it has to be tested whether the specification error of the proposed functional form is not significantly 
different form a fully flexible functional form that allows for different impacts of the discrete values of the 
covariate for each different age.  
Our econometric specification is initially similar to that of DRW. We consider the effect of the discontinuity 
at 22 years of age on the probability of being employed, unemployed or inactive. In particular, let yi be a variable 
equal to one if the individual is employed (unemployed, inactive). Then, we estimate the following equation:  
 
  
 
where F is a normal distribution function, agei is the age in months less the threshold (264 months for 22 years), 
dum is a dummy taking value of 1 when the individual is 22 or older and  includes additional terms such as the 
constant and the selected covariates. More specifically, as in DRW we includes as explanatory variables the 
individual’s qualifications, ethnic origin, apprenticeship, region of usual residence and whether the individual is 
a full time student. For our baseline results, age takes the form of a quadratic polynomial which we test against 
an alternatives fully-flexible specification with each age in months captured by a separate dummy. As is standard 
                                                          
11 While in principle this methodological difference should be rather innocuous, it may be one of the reasons for 
some of our results differing from those of Dickens, Riley and Wilkinson  
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when using the regression discontinuity approach, we allow for the effect of age to be different before and after 
the young workers attain the threshold age. It is important to note that in this specification any change in 
employment probability associated with the discontinuity can stem either from the level effect (coefficient of the 
discontinuity dummy variable) or the slope effect (change in the effect of the age polynomial). Therefore, the 
effect of reaching the threshold age can be evaluating by combining the coefficient estimated for the 
discontinuity dummy with the different effects of age before and after the threshold12: 
 (  
 
Table 1 reports regression results for the probability of being employed. We estimate separate regressions 
for males and females as well as for both genders together. The top panel presents results obtained while 
controlling for additional socio-economic characteristics while the bottom panel contain those obtained without 
additional controls. Unlike DRW, we consider all individuals, regardless of their skill level: as we argued above, 
young workers, skilled and unskilled, have very similar propensities to be paid the NMW.  Specification (1) is 
tested against a fully flexible functional form. For men we cannot rejected that both specifications are 
significantly different at the conventional levels while for women the quadratic specification was rejected, in 
which case we also considered a cubic specification with no material change in the results. The row denoted 
discontinuity reports the combined effect of the discontinuity dummy and the change in the coefficient estimates 
for the age polynomial. Dummy, in contrast, stands for the coefficient estimated for the discontinuity dummy 
alone. DRW only consider the sign and significance of this latter coefficient, which we believe ignores a 
potentially important part of the discontinuity effect. However, neither the full discontinuity effect nor the 
discontinuity dummy on its own are significant. This is in line with the findings of DRW who also report an 
insignificant result when they include all individuals rather than only the low skilled ones. Hence, we find no 
significant effect, whether positive or negative, of turning 22 on young workers’ employment.  
For the sake of comparability, we replicate DRW’s analysis of low-skilled workers, defined as those who 
left school at the age of 16 after completing their GCSEs and those who report having no qualifications. DRW 
found a significant positive effect of turning 22 for low-skilled workers, suggesting that becoming eligible for 
the adult NMW rate increases rather than reduced employment. Our results replicating their analysis are 
summarized in Table 2. They are broadly in line with those of DRW but weaker.13 In particular, while the 
discontinuity dummy is always positive, it is never significant for females; it is significant for males and for all 
                                                          
12 In non linear models, the marginal effect of a change in two interactive variables (age and dum) is not equal to 
the marginal effect of changing just the interaction term. Moreover, the sign may be different for different 
observations. Norton et al. (2004) explain how to compute interactive effects for probit models and we adapt this 
procedure to our particular case. 
13 Note that while we attempt to replicate DRW’s results, there are some potentially important differences 
between their analysis and ours. In particular, we consider a 15-month window before/after the individual’s 22nd 
birthday while they only consider 12 months, we compute the age in months slightly differently as discussed 
above, our data include three additional quarters in 2009, and, finally, although we sought to include the same 
covariates as them, it is possible that some of the covariates may be different or are formatted differently.  
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workers but only in the 5-10% range. More importantly, the combined effect of the discontinuity dummy and age 
polynomial is never even close to being significant. We are therefore unable to confirm their finding of a positive 
employment effect of turning 22 and becoming eligible for the adult NMW rate.  
Next, Tables 3 and 4 present the regression results for unemployment and inactivity, considering once more 
all workers regardless of their skill level. Again, the full effect of the discontinuity is never significant. Note 
however that the dummy alone is significant and negative in the regressions for unemployment with all 
individuals: this mirrors the similar finding of DRW; as we argue above, accepting this as the true effect of the 
discontinuity would be wrong as it ignores the fact that the effect of the age polynomial is also allowed to change 
upon surpassing the age threshold.  
In summary, we find thus no evidence that the approximately 20% increase in the rate of the NMW at the 
age of 22 has any effect – whether positive or negative – on young workers’ employment, unemployment or 
inactivity. This conclusion does not depend on whether we consider all young workers or only the unskilled 
ones.  
To probe the NMW effect on young workers further, we undertake a number of extensions. In Table 5, we 
consider the effect of turning 22 on employment conditional on the individual’s employment status (employed, 
unemployed or inactive) in the previous quarter. It may well be that the increase in the NMW rate that applies to 
workers as they reach their 22nd birthday affects employed and unemployed workers differently: while some of 
those who were employed at 21 may lose their jobs, others may only enter the labour market or intensify their 
job search attracted by the higher wage. If this were the case, then the overall effect, presented in Table 1, could 
be insignificant because these two kinds of effects cancel each other out. The analysis is again presented 
separately for males and females (to save on space, we are omitting the results for both genders). In the first two 
columns of Table 5, we present the estimates for the probability of remaining employed, conditional on being 
employed already. The estimated effect of turning 22 is negative, especially for men, but it is not even close to 
being significant at conventionally accepted levels. Hence, young workers who were employed at the age of 21 
are no more or less likely to be employed after their 22nd birthday. The next two columns present the estimates of 
the probability of being employed at 22, conditional on being unemployed before. The last two columns, in turn, 
present the corresponding estimates for those who were inactive before the quarter in which they turned 22. 
Again, none of these coefficients are significant, suggesting that controlling for the labour market status of 
young workers just before they turn 22 makes little difference to our findings.  
In Table 6, we consider only those young workers who they earn less than the adult rate when they are 21. 
Such workers are bound to be affected by the age-mandated increase in the NMW upon turning 22. The previous 
analyses, in contrast, included all workers, regardless of whether their wages had to be raised. As before, we are 
unable to find any significant discontinuity effect on employment probability. One drawback of this analysis, 
however, is the rather small sample size.  
As the last robustness check, we perform falsification tests for workers turning 21 and 23 (Table 7). The 
finding of no significant effect at 22 years of age may be either attributed to the NMW having no impact on 
employment, or it may indicate that the employment effect does not coincide with the workers’ 22nd birthdays. In 
particular, employers may seek to dismiss workers in a way that could not be easily construed as motivated by 
the age-related NMW increase. If this is the case, then we might expect the employment effect to take place at 
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some point before or after the workers turn 22. This is indeed what appears to happen: male workers are 
significantly less likely to remain employed after turning 21; in contrast, reaching their 23rd birthday has no 
significant impact on employment of males or females. The fall in employment probability at 21 years for men 
may be an anticipation effect: employers are aware of the age-related NMW increase that young workers are 
entitled to after their 22nd birthday and dismiss them well in advance of the relevant date. Note that this negative 
result only appears when we consider the combined effect of the discontinuity dummy and the coefficients for 
the age polynomial: the dummy alone is not significant. This again highlights the importance of assessing the 
full effect of the discontinuity and the changed effect of age rather than considering only the coefficient of the 
discontinuity dummy. 
Finally, we replicate the discontinuity analysis at 21st, 22nd and 23rd birthday with 6 and 12 month estimation 
windows instead of 15 months used to generate the results discussed so far. In general, the regressions generate 
weaker results (see the Appendix). Those obtained with the 6 month window are never significant. This may be 
due to the lower number of observations with the shorter estimation window. Moreover, the discontinuity effect 
may take time to become sufficiently pronounced. The regressions utilizing the 12 month window generally 
paint the same picture as those discussed above. In particular, the discontinuity effect is negative both at the age 
of 21 and 22 for males; the former is marginally significant at 10% while the latter is not significant.  
The finding of a significant negative effect for males at the age of 21 is interesting and perplexing at the 
same time. Therefore, we pursue it further and consider the discontinuity for every age in one-month increments 
between 20 and 23 years. Since we estimate dozens of coefficients, it is more instructive to depict the results 
graphically. Figure 1 presents the results for males. The solid line captures the employment effect while the 
dotted lines correspond to the 95% confidence interval. An interesting pattern emerges: the probability of being 
employed dips in the neighborhood of both the 21st and 22nd birthdays (252 and 264 months, respectively). Only 
the first dip is significant, however, suggesting that young male workers are significantly less likely to be 
employed as they approach their 21st birthday. The employment probability rebounds subsequently: just after the 
20th birthday, then again at approximately at 21.5 years of age and at around 22.5. The first two of those peaks 
are significantly different from zero whereas being between 22 and 23 is not associated with a significant 
increase in the employment probability. The estimates for women are strikingly different, as Figure 2 shows: 
none of the age effects between 21 and 23 years are significant. Moreover, as is also the case in Table 1, the 
quadratic age polynomial is rejected by the model, as is also the cubic alternative (the latter results, presented in 
Figure 3, also yield insignificant effects).14  
We can only speculate what drives these results. The age-related NMW rates apply equally to men and 
women yet we only observe age-related effects for the former. This may reflect the fact that the labour market 
positions of men and women are substantially different from each other. As we argued above, the negative effect 
around men’s 21st birthday may be due to anticipation effects whereby employers choose to dismiss workers 
well in advance of the age-related NMW increase. Moreover, as the age-related NMW increases follows an 
entirely deterministic process that all young workers are subject to, the effect on employment can indeed occur at 
                                                          
14 Because of the insignificant results obtained for ages between 21 and 23 and also in the light of the 
quadratic/cubic polynomial being rejected, we did not extend the analysis for women to their 20
th
 birthday.  
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any time before the discontinuity: an employer seeking to avoid employing 22 years olds likewise has little 
incentive to hire someone who is 21 or 21.5 years old.  
An alternative explanation could be that the negative effect around the 21st birthday is due to an influx of 
university graduates into the job market which increases the competition for jobs. However, while it is true that 
university students graduate when they are 21 (assuming they went to university immediately after completing 
secondary education), the bulk of them enter the job market in the summer or autumn after graduation. They 
would therefore reach 21 years of age during their final year in university and only a small fraction of them 
would be turning 21 exactly at the time when they graduate.  
Finally, we also consider the NMW threshold at 18 years of age. Recall that those turning 18 become 
eligible for the development rate which historically has been some 35% above the 16-17 rate. As before, we 
consider all workers, irrespective of skills (although the differences in skill levels at this age are not particularly 
large). Table 8 reports the results. The effect of turning 18 appears significantly negative for both genders: 
becoming eligible for the higher NMW rate is associated with lower employment probability. Note that again 
this negative effect becomes apparent only when we consider both the coefficient estimated for the discontinuity 
dummy and the changed effect of the age polynomial: the dummy itself is not significantly different from zero 
(except for females). The insignificant coefficient for the discontinuity dummy is in line with the finding of 
DRW. The differences in the conclusions reached when considering the discontinuity dummy only and when 
looking also at the changed effects of the age polynomial again underscores the importance of assessing the full 
effect of the discontinuity.  
As we argued before, turning 18 is associated with a host of other important changes besides becoming 
eligible for a higher NMW rate. For example, UK law requires anyone selling or serving alcohol to be 18 or 
older, which makes those under 18 ineligible to work in bars, restaurants and many shops. This makes the 
negative effect that we found all the more remarkable. Again, an alternative explanation would link the effect 
that we observe to the end of full-time secondary education. In the UK, education is currently compulsory until 
the age of 16 but many students stay enrolled for another two years to complete their secondary education. Those 
who do so without enrolling in higher education upon graduating then generally enter the job market when aged 
18. Nevertheless, as with university graduates, few would leave full time education close to their 18 th birthday. 
Rather, the students in their final year of secondary education turn 18 over the course of their last year. 
Therefore, the negative employment effect is unlikely to be attributable to changes in participation in education. 
Note that our analysis is based on the estimation of the functional form presented in expression (1). 
However, it is also relevant to study if main conclusions in the paper still are upheld when we adopt an 
specification similar to (1) but imposing the restrictions   and  . Although we prefer specification 
(1) because it already encompassed this restricted case and also it allows for comparison with DRW, the 
constrained version of the model has the advantage that restrictions are accepted at the usual confidence levels 
and that the discontinuity impact can be easily computed as the marginal effect of the dummy variable  
without taking consideration of the interaction effect between  and . Under the restricted model for all 
workers, we also find strong evidence of the negative effect of NMW on the probability of employment at 18 (-
0.02 with a p-value of 0.001). Moreover, the falsification impact at 21 is negative but only marginally significant 
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(-0.009 with a p-value of 0.097). Finally, we find no significant effect at 22 (0.002 with a p-value of 0.39) and a 
significant and positive impact at 23 (0.01 with p-value:0.009).  
Hence, our results suggest that the age related NMW rates are indeed having an adverse effect on the 
employment of young workers. However, the nature of the effect is not entirely straightforward. In particular, it 
is possible that, due to anticipation effects, employers dismiss workers in advance of them reaching the age when 
the higher wage is supposed to take effect.  
 
5 Conclusions 
The received wisdom concerning the effect of the UK national minimum wage is that it has had little adverse 
impact on employment. In this paper, we revisit this issue. We consider young workers and investigate whether 
their employment prospects are affected by the fact that different rates apply to different age groups: the 
minimum wage rates are different for those who are 16-17, 18-21 and above 22 years old. Using the regression-
discontinuity approach, we find that although the effect of turning 22 is negative, it is not statistically significant. 
This contrasts with an earlier finding by Dickens, Riley and Wilkinson (2010) who argued that becoming eligible 
for the higher adult rate from the age of 22 increases the employment of unskilled young workers. We believe 
their finding is potentially flawed because they do not take into account the fact that the effect of age on 
employment probability may also change at discontinuity. Specifically, their analysis (as ours) allows the 
discontinuity to affect the dependent variable through the coefficient of the discontinuity dummy as well as by 
allowing age to have a different effects before and after the discontinuity. Dickens, Riley and Wilkinson only 
consider the former effect. When we account for the combined effect of the dummy and the changed effect of 
age, we find that turning 22 has no effect on the employment of young workers, whether they are unskilled or 
skilled.  
In contrast, we do find evidence of a negative employment effect for males at the age of 21. While in the 
period we have studied the NMW does not change at this age, we believe this result may be driven by the 
anticipation of the later minimum wage increase at 22. This reflects the specific nature of the case that we, and 
Dickens, Riley and Wilkinson, consider. While the regression discontinuity approach is usually used to study the 
effects of outcomes that are assigned (approximately) randomly, there is nothing random about the outcome in 
this case: all young workers eventually turn 22. The effect associated with the discontinuity (higher NMW rate 
applying to those aged 22 and above) therefore can occur anywhere in the neighborhood of the discontinuity age, 
whether before or after. The fact that we find a negative effect approximately one year before we initially 
expected it to occur intuitively makes sense. The cost of hiring a 21-year old is substantially lower only for 
employers seeking short-term staff; those wishing to retain this worker in the long term would enjoy only a 
temporary cost advantage.  
Our findings thus suggest that the age specific minimum wage rates do affect employment. This is 
confirmed also by our finding that both genders experience a negative employment effect at the age of 18, when 
they become eligible for the 18-21 NMW rate (35% higher than the 16-17 rate).  
The UK NMW rules concerning young workers were modified in October 2010 in that the threshold age for 
the adult rate has been lowered from 22to 21. Future research will show whether this has hurt the employment 
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prospects of young workers. Our findings would suggest that the age at which this effect occurs may shift further 
so that even workers younger than 21 may see their employment prospects affected.  
Finally, our work has two important methodological implications. First, it underscores that when applying 
the regression discontinuity approach to non-random deterministic processes through time, the effect need not 
coincide with the discontinuity. Instead, it can occur either before or after the discontinuity is reached. Second, it 
is important to correctly account for the effect of the regression discontinuity in cases when it can entail both 
level and slope effects. In particular, the negative employment effects that we find at 18 and 21 are only apparent 
when we consider both the coefficient estimated for the discontinuity dummy and the change in the coefficients 
for age after the discontinuity. 
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Table 1 Discontinuity Effect on Employment: All Young Workers. Marginal 
effects at mean values and standard deviations between brackets. 
 All  Males  Females  
 with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
 without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
Discontinuity
(1)
  .00122  
(.00244)  
.00227 
(.00236)  
-.00228 
(.00331)  
.00055 
(.00328)  
.00368 
(.00353)  
.00356 
(.00336)  
Dum
(2)
  .00482  
(.00800)  
.00480 
(.00772)  
.00567 
(.01097)  
.00502  
(.0107)  
.00589 
(.01154)  
.00348  
(.01103)  
No. observations  136,591  136,591  66,582  66,582  70,009  70,009  
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
26345.97  638.70  15412.56  480.74  12942.46  218.54  
Pr>Chi 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
R2  0.1524  0.0037  0.1918  0.0060  0.1411  0.0024  
Chi-statistic for 
quadratic  
27.11  29.11  27.55  . 34.08  44.13  53.25  
Pr>Chi  0.3503  0.2539  0.3292  0.1063  0.0105  0.0008  
Notes: (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the impact of age and the 
threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable. 
Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Table 2 Discontinuity Effect on Employment: Low Skilled Young Workers. 
Marginal effects at mean values and standard deviations between brackets. 
 All  Males  Females  
 with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
 without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
Discontinuity
(1)
  .00211 
(.00418) 
.00224 
(.00415) 
.00214 
(.00555) 
.00270 
(.00561) 
.00061 
(.00595) 
.00193 
(.00589) 
Dum
(2)
  .02940 
(.01402)* 
.02241 
(01386) 
.03380 
(.01852) 
.02807 
(.01859) 
.02486 
(.02002) 
.01822 
(.01971) 
No. observations  43809 43809 20457 20457 23352 23352 
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
2686.26  3.24 1621.56 42.32 1174.80 14.47 
Pr>Chi 0.0000 0.6633 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0129 
R2  0.0478 0.0001 0.0705 0.0018 0.0370 0.0005 
Chi-statistic for 
quadratic  
45.31 43.99 24.89 30.52 61.38 58.20 
Pr>Chi  0.0077 0.0109 0.4683 0.2054 0.0001 0.0002 
Notes: (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the impact of age and the 
threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable. 
Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Table 3 Discontinuity Effect on Unemployment. Marginal effects at mean values 
and standard deviations between brackets. 
 All  Males  Females  
 with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
 without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
Discontinuity
(1)
  .00118 
(.00126)  
.00107 
(.00135)  
.00190 
(.00195)  
.00175 
(.00212)  
.00037 
(.00160)  
.000200 
(.00170)  
Dum
(2)
  -.008830 
(.00425)* 
-.00919 
(.00452)* 
-.01013 
(.00659)  
-.01104  
(.0071)  
-.00844 
(.00535)  
-.00819 
(.00565)  
No. observations  136,591  136,591  66,582  66,582  70,009  70,009  
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
3489.80  61.34  2721.18  44.54  1170.22  15.95  
Pr>Chi 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0070  
R2  0.0446  0.0008  0.0621  0.0010  0.0347  0.0005  
Chi-statistic for 
quadratic  
19.40  15.69  26.00  23.85  23.16  20.95  
Pr>Chi  0.7776  0.9237  0.4078  0.5278  0.5682  0.6955  
Notes: (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the impact of age and the 
threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable. 
Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Table 4 Discontinuity Effect on Inactivity. Marginal effects at mean values and 
standard deviations between brackets. 
 All  Males  Females  
 with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
 without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
Discontinuity
(1)
  -.00151 
(.00160)  
-.00347 
(.00220)  
.00038 
(.00249)  
-.00252  
(.00291)  
-.00451 
(.00334)  
-.00389  
(.00323)  
Dum
(2)
  .00539 
(.00698)  
.00444 
(.00705)  
.00695 
(.00819)  
.00615  
(.00919)  
.00287  
(.01072)  
.00474 
(.01047)  
No. observations  136,591  136,591  66,582  66,582  70,009  70,009  
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
29973.84  541.74  20380.64  446.08  13752.84  189.13  
Pr>Chi 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
R2  0.1971  0.0036  0.3135  0.0069  0.1614  0.0022  
Chi-statistic for 
quadratic  
21.83  25.18  27.69  24.00  30.59  46.73  
Pr>Chi  0.6455  0.4521  0.3225  0.5194  0.2030  0.0053  
Notes: (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the impact of age and the 
threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable. 
Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Table 5 Probability of Employment Conditional on Employment Status in Previous 
Quarter. Marginal effects at mean values and standard deviations between brackets. 
 All  Males  Females  
 with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
 without 
covariates  
with 
covariates  
without 
covariates  
Discontinuity
(1)
  -.00184 
(.00158)  
-.00004 
(.00181)  
-.01189 
(.00936)  
.01636 
(.01102)  
.00030 
(.00663)  
-.00500 
(.00518)  
Dum
(2)
  .00483 
(.00822)  
.00114 
(.00843)  
-.01864 
(.04345)  
.01636 
(.05514)  
.03364  
(.02418)  
.02886 
(.01552)  
No. observations  27921  26030  3956  2671  6795  11815  
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
42.09  30.76  7.89  11.21  7.48  10.13  
Pr>Chi 0.0000  0.0000  0.1625  0.0473  0.1876  0.0716  
R2  0.0037  0.0029  0.0017  0.0033  0.0016  0.0014  
Notes: (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the impact of age and the 
threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable. 
Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Table 6 Probability of Employment for Workers Earning Less than Adult Rate. Marginal effects at 
mean values and standard deviations between brackets. 
 Males  Females  
Discontinuity
(1)
  .000242 
(.01783)  
-.00684 
(.01279)  
Dum
(2)
  .014173 
(.04104)  
.008331   
(.03483)  
No. observations  1365  1931  
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression 
4.06  7.96  
Pr>Chi  0.5404  0.1582  
R2  0.0047  0.0066  
Notes: None of the estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect 
taking into account the impact of age and the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated 
impact of the threshold dummy variable.  
Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. Source: Labour Force Survey. The 
regressions do not contain additional control variables due to low number of 
observations.  
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Table 7 Falsification Tests: Discontinuity Effects at 21 and 23. Marginal effects at 
mean values and standard deviations between brackets. 
 21 years  23 years  
 Males  Females  Males  Females  
Discontinuity
(1)
  -.00994  
(.00326)**  
-.001039  
(.00349) 
.00435 
(.00318)  
-.00179 
(.00336)  
Dum
(2)
  -.00764 
(.01150)  
-.00186 
(.01184)  
.01043 
(.01023)  
-.01325 
(.01138)  
No. observations  68324  70647  65206  70622  
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression  
17001.14  12155.02  13443.49  14310.83  
Pr>Chi 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
R2  0.1947  0.11285  0.1879  0.1602  
Notes: All the estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking 
into account the impact of age and the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact 
of the threshold dummy variable. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
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Table 8 Discontinuity Effects at 18. Marginal effects at mean values and standard 
deviations between brackets. 
 
 Males  Females  All  
Discontinuity
(1)
  -0.01018 
(0.00361)** 
-.01009 
(.00362)** 
-0.00984 
(0.00255)** 
Dum
(2)
  -0.00238 
(0.01253) 
-.0253495 
(.01263)* 
-.012706 
(0.00888) 
No. observations  67641 65023 132664 
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression 
16587.27 9896.45 25665.83 
Pr>Chi  0.0000 0.0000 0.000 
R2  0.1788 0.1110 0.1410 
Notes: All the estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking 
into account the impact of age and the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact 
of the threshold dummy variable. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. 
Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Figure 1 Discontinuity Effects by Month, Ages 18 to 24, Males 
 
Notes: The points at which birthdays occur are: 18 years (216 months), 19 (228), 20 (240), 21 
(252), 22 (264), 23 (276) and 24 years (288 months). Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence 
interval.  
 
Figure 2 Discontinuity Effects by Month, Ages 18 to 24, Females (quadratic age 
polynomial) 
 
Notes: The points at which birthdays occur are: 18 years (216 months), 19 (228), 20 (240), 21 
(252), 22 (264), 23 (276) and 24 years (288 months). Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence 
interval.  
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Figure 3 Discontinuity Effects by Month, Ages 18 to 24, Females (cubic age 
polynomial) 
 
Notes: The points at which birthdays occur are: 18 years (216 months), 19 (228), 20 (240), 21 
(252), 22 (264), 23 (276) and 24 years (288 months). Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence 
interval.  
 
Figure 4 Discontinuity Effects by Month, Ages 18 to 24, Both Genders 
 
Notes: The points at which birthdays occur are: 18 years (216 months), 19 (228), 20 (240), 21 
(252), 22 (264), 23 (276) and 24 years (288 months). Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence 
interval. 
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Appendix 
Regression-discontinuity analysis: Alternative time windows 
 
Total workers. Discontinuity Effects at 21, 22 and 23 
 21 years  22 years 23 years 
 6 months  12 months  6 months 12 months  6 months 12 months 
Discontinuity
(1)
  .00092 
(.00969) 
-.00461 
(.00350) 
.00116 
(.00965) 
-.00045 
(.00350) 
-.00961 
(.00891) 
.00096 
(.00334) 
Dum
(2)
  .01341 
(.01425) 
-.00430 
(.00945) 
.01026 
(.01395) 
.01483 
(.02617) 
-.01239 
(.01323) 
-.00188 
(.00876)       
No. observations  57797 109453 57513 108102 56417 107005 
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression 
11048.03 21478.97 11245.37 20836.73 10430.78 19855.19 
Pr>Chi  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2  0.1458 0.1496 0.1536 0.1520 0.1563 0.1562 
Notes: All the estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking 
into account the impact of age and the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact 
of the threshold dummy variable. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. 
Source: Labour Force Survey.  
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Male workers. Discontinuity Effects at 21, 22 and 23 
 21 years  22 years 23 years 
 6 months  12 months  6 months 12 months  6 months 12 months 
Discontinuity
(1)
 .01042 
(.01352) 
-.00883 
(.00476) 
-.00024 
(.00793) 
-.00239 
(.00479) 
.01077 
(.01269) 
.00532 
(.00459) 
Dum
(2)
   .02918 
(.01976) 
-.00307 
(.01316)    
.00052 
(.01919)         
-.00303       
(.01260) 
-.00365 
(.01750)        
.00668 
(.01159)       
No. observations  28583 53899 27978   52724 27086 51396 
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression 
6610.71 13098.40 6656.79 12248.60 5547.02 10567.76 
Pr>Chi  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2  0.1812 0.1900 0.1955 0.1919 0.1885 0.1888 
Notes: All the estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking 
into account the impact of age and the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact 
of the threshold dummy variable. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
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Female workers. Discontinuity Effects at 21, 22 and 23 
 21 years  22 years 23 years 
 6 months  12 months  6 months 12 months  6 months 12 months 
Discontinuity
(1)
 -.00925 
(.01389) 
-.00136 
(.00508) 
-.00665 
(.01375) 
.01457 
(.01321) 
-.01932 
(.01955) 
-.00362 
(.00484) 
Dum
(2)
   -.00170 
(.02049) 
-.00589 
(.01353) 
.02335 
(.02011 ) 
.00031 
(.00506) 
-.02845 
(.01264807) 
-.01020 
(.01295) 
No. observations  29214 55554 29535 55378 29331 55609 
Chi-statistic for 
Whole regression 
5040.66 9529.44 5505.22 10287.81 5987.72 11228.77 
Pr>Chi  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2  0.1290 0.1282 0.1417 0.1417 0.1628 0.1602 
Notes: All the estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking 
into account the impact of age and the threshold dummy variable; (2) estimated impact 
of the threshold dummy variable. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
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Not-for-publication Appendix. Computation of Marginal effects. 
 
There is a discontinuity in equation (1) when  and the derivative  is not defined for that 
point. In this case, following Norton et al. (2004), the discontinuity can be computed as 
 
 
 
 
